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COMMENT

The Contribution of Brazil’s ‘Responsibility
while Protecting’ Proposal to the
‘Responsibility to Protect’ Doctrine
ALYSE PRAWDE†
INTRODUCTION
As a result of the ongoing civil war in Syria, more than 146,000
people have been killed1 and at least six million people have fled
their homes.2 Over nine million people are in need of humanitarian
assistance.3 On August 21, 2013, the Syrian government is said to
have used chemical weapons, killing an estimated 1,300 of its own
civilians.4 Over the course of the ongoing three-year civil war, the
United Nations Security Council has only passed three minor
resolutions and a February 2014 resolution calling for humanitarian
aid access.5 During the civil war, the Security Council has neither
issued sanctions nor authorized military force to assist the people of
† Executive Articles Editor, Maryland Journal of International Law, 20132014; J.D., University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, May
2014; B.A., College of William & Mary. The author wishes to thank her family and
friends for their endless support and encouragement, and Professors Peter Danchin,
Maxwell Chibundu, and the staff of the Maryland Journal of International Law for
their feedback and guidance on this Comment.
1. Noah Rayman, Report: More than 146,000 People Killed in Syrian Civil
War, TIME (Mar. 13, 2014), http://time.com/24077/syria-death-toll/.
2. UN Off. for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aff., Syria Crisis,
http://syria.unocha.org/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2014).
3. Id.
4. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Government
Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on Aug. 21,
2013 (Aug. 30, 2013) (on file with the author).
5. See S.C. Res. 2042, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2042, at 1–2 (Apr. 14, 2012)
(authorizing UN advance team to monitor ceasefire in Syria); S.C. Res. 2043, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/2043, at 1–2 (Apr. 21, 2012) (authorizing UN observer mission in
Syria); S.C. Res. 2118, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2118, at 1–2 (Sept. 27, 2013) (requiring
expeditious and verifiable destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons); S.C. Res.
2139, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2139 (Feb. 22, 2014) (urging all member states to offer
humanitarian aid to people affected by the crisis).
184
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Syria. The Security Council’s failure to take any significant action
has led to strong criticisms of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine
(commonly referred to as R2P),6 an emerging international norm
which asserts that if sovereign states cannot fulfill their responsibility
to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing,
and crimes against humanity, the international community has the
responsibility to protect those citizens by taking collective action.7
When R2P was first introduced and adopted by most of the
international community nearly a decade ago, the still-developing
norm was heralded for its potential to be recognized as a wellestablished international norm.8 Today, while R2P’s tenets are nearly
universally accepted, the scope of its implementation remains highly
contested, particularly the issue of whether to authorize military force
to intervene in a state when prevention of mass atrocities has failed.9
The first time the international community used R2P to authorize
military force was NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011, acting on
Security Council Resolution 1973.10 While Western states and R2P’s
strongest proponents celebrated the quick and decisive action in
Libya as a high-watermark for R2P,11 numerous developing
countries, most notably Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
(the BRICS), criticized the intervention.12 The BRICS believed
6. The Crisis in Syria, INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESP. TO PROTECT,
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-syria (last visited
Nov. 13, 2013).
7. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–39, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005).
8. See U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility: Rep. of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change,
¶ 203, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) (endorsing the norm).
9. Gareth Evans, R2P Down but Not Out After Libya and Syria, OPEN
DEMOCRACY (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/gare
th-evans/r2p-down-but-not-out-after-libya-and-syria.
10. Herman Schaper, Responsibility to Protect: An Emerging Principle, INT’L
COALITION FOR THE RESP. TO PROTECT (June 28, 2011), http://www.responsibilityt
oprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-topics/3554-qresponsib
ility-to-protect-an-emerging-principleq.
11. See Ramesh Thakur, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: Between
Opportunistic Humanitarianism and Value-Free Pragmatism, 7 SECURITY
CHALLENGES 13, 19 (Summer 2011), available at http://www.securitychallenges.or
g.au/ArticlePDFs/vol7no4Thakur.pdf (“In Libya, it took just one month to mobilise
a broad coalition, secure a UN mandate to protect civilians, establish and enforce
no-fly and no-drive zones, and stop Gaddafi’s advancing army and prevent a
massacre of the innocents in Benghazi.”).
12. Id. at 21–22.
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NATO overstepped the mandate by engaging in regime change.13 As
a result, in November 2011, Brazil introduced the concept of
Responsibility while Protecting (RwP), which reaffirmed R2P’s
emphasis on prevention, and proposed criteria, such as last resort and
balance of consequences, to be considered before the Security
Council mandates the use of military force.14 RwP also calls for a
monitoring-and-review mechanism to provoke debate regarding the
implementation of a resolution.15
This comment argues that to increase the potential success and
fuller recognition of R2P as an international norm, R2P should
embrace the core arguments set forth in RwP. Otherwise, nonWestern countries will continue to be hesitant to get involved in
human rights crises, as evidenced by the conflict in Syria. Part I of
this article will examine the development of R2P, consider the
important documents that have shaped the doctrine, and briefly
analyze R2P’s role in both Libya and Syria, as a way of
understanding how RwP emerged as a concept.16 Part II of this article
will provide an overview of RwP, consider its key tenets, and
compare RwP to R2P, arguing that RwP was not meant to be a
competing norm, but should instead be embraced as a means of
dialogue on improving R2P.17 Part III will consider how the
incorporation of RwP into R2P would beneficially shape the future of
R2P as an international norm.18
13. Oliver Stuenkel, BRICS and the ‘Responsibility While Protecting’ Concept,
THE HINDU (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article29851
90.ece.
14. Id. Last resort is the international precautionary principle that “[m]ilitary
intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for the prevention
or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored.” Int’l Comm’n on
Intervention and State Sovereignty [ICISS], The Responsibility to Protect, at xii
(Dec. 2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.
Balance of consequences means that the result of the intervention should cause less
peril than that of inaction. Evans, supra note 9.
15. Stuenkel, supra note 13. Monitoring-and-review is a mechanism through
which states in the Security Council “discuss and debate the implementation of any
ongoing R2P action.” Stewart M. Patrick, R2P on Life Support: Humanitarian
Norms vs. Practical Realities in Syria, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (June 12, 2013),
http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2013/06/12/r2p-on-life-support-humanitarian-norms-vspractical-realities-in-syria/.
16. See infra Part I.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
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I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF R2P

A.

Emergence of R2P at the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty

The R2P principle was introduced in the December 2001 report
of the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS), an independent, Canadian-sponsored
commission.19 The catalyst of ICISS’s report was NATO’s
intervention in Kosovo without Security Council authorization,20
though the doctrine also arose out of the large-scale tragedies of the
twentieth-century, namely the Holocaust, the killing fields of
Cambodia, and the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica.21
Additionally, ICISS was formed to answer the question put forth by
then-Secretary General Kofi Annan: “[I]f humanitarian intervention
is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we
respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic
violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common
humanity?”22 Secretary General Annan’s question highlighted the
tension between two leading principles of international law: The first
is that states have the inherent right to sovereignty, which provides
the ability to govern without international interference in domestic
affairs, including the threat or use of military force against them, as
stated in Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter.23 The second
requires states to protect their citizens’ fundamental rights and
freedoms, as declared as one of the purposes of the United Nations in
its Charter.24
While humanitarian intervention is, at its core, focused on
coercive military intervention for humanitarian purposes, R2P is first

19. AIDAN HEHIR, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 1 (2012).
20. Anne Orford, Lawful Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, in
LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS 248, 250 (Richard Falk, Mark
Juergensmeyer & Vesselin Popovski eds., 2012).
21. Timely and Decisive Response Vital to Uphold ‘Responsibility to Protect,’
UN NEWS CENTRE (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsI
D=42806&Cr=responsibility+to+protect&Cr1=#.UNDDk1HA9UT.
22. U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in
the Twenty-First Century, ¶ 217, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Mar. 27, 2000).
23. Julia Hoffman & André Nollkaemper, Introduction to RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT: FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE 13, 13 (Julia Hoffmann & André
Nollkaemper eds., 2012).
24. Id.
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and foremost dedicated to prevention.25 When the R2P concept was
first introduced in 2001, its principles were not groundbreaking ideas,
as they had grown out of the human rights, humanitarian, and human
security movements of the previous decades.26 French Minister
Bernard Kouchner, for instance, advocated for the right to interfere in
humanitarian crises during the 1980s.27 However, what was
groundbreaking was how R2P shifted the discussion away from its
“cousin”—humanitarian intervention.28
The ICISS report put forth the notion that sovereign states have a
responsibility to protect their citizens from avoidable catastrophes,
such as murder and starvation, but when they are unwilling or unable
to provide protection, the responsibility falls to the international
community.29 While the ICISS report addressed the rules and
authority for the use of force, its focus was on the “advantages of
prevention through encouraging States to meet their core protection
responsibilities.”30 The Commission also broadened the range of
responses from those that are available under humanitarian
intervention, which focuses solely on military reaction.31 In sum, the
ICISS report stated that there are three main elements to a response:
first, short- and long-term preventive action—to avoid harm in the
first place; second, reaction—to address the harm when preventive

25. GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ENDING MASS
ATROCITY CRIMES ONCE AND FOR ALL 56 (2008).
26. Ruan Zongze, Responsible Protection, CHINA DAILY (Mar. 15, 2012, 8:06
AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-03/15/content_14837835.htm.
27. EVANS, supra note 25, at 32–33.
28. Orford, supra note 20, at 248. Humanitarian intervention is the doctrine
that there is a “‘right to intervene’ militarily in these cases, against the will of the
government of the country in question.” EVANS, supra note 25, at 3.
29. Int’l Comm’n on Intervention and State Sovereignty: Responsibility to
Protect Report, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Dec. 2001), http://www.cfr.org/humani
tarian-intervention/international-commission-intervention-state-sovereigntyresponsibility-protect-report/p24228.
30. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep.
of the Secretary-General, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009).
31. Gareth Evans, Co-Chair, Global Ctr. for the Resp. to Protect, President
Emeritus of the Int’l Crisis Group, former Foreign Minister of Austl., Cent.
European Sch. of Pub. Policy, Responding to Mass Atrocity Crimes: The
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) After Libya and Syria (Oct. 24, 2012) (transcript
available at http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech496.html).
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action has failed; and third, post-crisis rebuilding—to prevent a
recurrence of the harm at issue.32
B.

The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document

R2P had an “almost unprecedented” acceptance by the
international community, when more than 150 heads of state and
government endorsed R2P’s key principles at the UN World Summit
in 2005.33 The World Summit Outcome Document (Outcome
Document) of 2005 contained two paragraphs pertaining to R2P—
Paragraphs 138 and 139—which limited the scope of protection to
four types of crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and
crimes against humanity.34 Although Paragraphs 138 and 139 upheld
the core R2P principles,35 the Outcome Document deviated from the
ICISS report, which referred to “large-scale loss of life,” one of two
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–39, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005). Paragraphs 138 and 139 provide as follows:
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that
responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise
this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early
warning capability.
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has
the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter,
to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing
and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a caseby-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities
manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the
General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the
principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit
ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress
before crises and conflicts break out.
Id.
35. Id.
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thresholds capable of activating R2P.36 According to the Outcome
Document, the international community, through the United Nations,
has the responsibility to use diplomatic, humanitarian, and other
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the UN
Charter, to protect populations from the four listed mass atrocities.37
The Security Council, in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, must be prepared to “take collective action, in a timely and
decisive manner,” when peaceful means are inadequate, and should
take such action on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with the
relevant regional organizations.38
According to Gareth Evans, who co-chaired ICISS, the Outcome
Document’s language was positive in a number of respects.39 First,
the Outcome Document, more so than the ICISS report, placed
greater emphasis on prevention and the responsibilities of states to
assist other states in developing preventive capabilities.40 Second, the
Outcome Document focused strongly on reactive measures that fall
short of military action.41 Third, the central role of the United
Nations, particularly the Security Council, in addressing military
enforcement was consistent with earlier recommendations.42 Evans
notes that the “only disappointing omission from the Outcome
Document is the failure to adopt any criteria for the use of military
force, leaving the argument for such guidelines to be made another
day.”43 Unlike the ICISS document, the provisions outlining R2P in
the Outcome Document neither reintroduced criteria for the use of
force by the United Nations nor recognized the legality of armed
humanitarian intervention beyond what the UN Charter previously

36. ICISS, supra note 14, at xii. The second threshold capable of triggering
R2P is “large scale ‘ethnic cleansing.’” Id.
37. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 139, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005).
38. Id.
39. EVANS, supra note 25, at 47–48.
40. Id. at 47.
41. Id. at 47–48.
42. Id. at 48.
43. Id.
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stated.44 These ambiguities regarding military force remain
unresolved in debates about R2P.45
C. R2P’s General Acceptance at the United Nations and Adoption
of its Modern Framework
Overall, the principles of R2P have “been incorporated into
United Nations operations in a way that humanitarian intervention
never was.”46 Secretary General Ban Ki-moon promised soon after
his appointment in 2007 that he would “spare no effort to
operationalize [R2P].”47 The General Assembly and Security Council
have reaffirmed R2P, and regional organizations, such as the
European Union, have also embraced the concept with seemingly
more willingness than was the case with humanitarian intervention.48
There was minimal application and discussion of R2P during the
period from 2005 to 2009,49 though the doctrine was referred to
several times during this period. In Resolution 1674, the Security
Council “reaffirmed” Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome
Document in April 2006.50 In Resolution 1706, the Security Council
applied the R2P principle to a particular context for the first time
when it called for the deployment of UN peacekeepers to Darfur in
August 2006.51 In 2008, ethnic-related violence erupted in Kenya
following allegations that a national election was rigged, and over
1,000 people were killed and 300,000 people were displaced.52
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon characterized the events in Kenya as
an R2P situation, and Genocide Adviser Francis Deng called on
Kenyan leaders to “meet their responsibility to protect the civilian

44. CRISTINA GABRIELA BADESCU, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 7 (2011).
45. Gareth Evans, Co-Chair, Global Ctr. for the Resp. to Protect, Mass
Atrocities and the Use of Force: R2P After Libya and Syria (Oct. 16, 2012)
(transcript available at http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech492.html).
46. Orford, supra note 20, at 252.
47. Id. at 252–53.
48. Id. at 253.
49. HEHIR, supra note 19, at 50. The international community did not use R2P
to justify military intervention until 2011, when Security Council Resolution 1973
used R2P to authorize NATO intervention in Libya. Schaper, supra note 10.
50. S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006).
51. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Expands Mandate of UN
Mission in Sudan to Include Darfur, Adopting Resolution 1706 by Vote of 12 in
Favour, with 3 Abstaining, U.N. Press Release SC/8821 (Aug. 31, 2012).
52. EVANS, supra note 25, at 51.

192

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:184

population.”53 Kofi Annan led a mediation team that negotiated a
political settlement just a few weeks after the start of the violence.54
The response was viewed by the United Nations as a success for
R2P.55
Since the ICISS report, R2P has focused less on what its threepart structure of prevention, response, and rebuild entails, than on
how to respond.56 Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s January 2009
Report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (2009 Report)
gave R2P its now widely accepted terminological framework as three
principles: (1) a state has a responsibility to protect its population
from mass atrocities; (2) the international community has a
responsibility to assist the state if it is unable to protect its population
on its own; and (3) if the state fails to protect its citizens from mass
atrocities and peaceful measures have failed, the international
community has the responsibility to intervene through coercive
measures such as economic sanctions, and military intervention is
considered the last resort.57 The 2009 Report, the first comprehensive
document from the UN Secretariat on R2P, also noted that
Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document are anchored in
international law.58 “Under conventional and customary international
law, States have obligations to prevent and punish genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity,” and any action in Paragraphs
138 and 139 must be in conformity with the UN Charter.59 The 2009
Report also called for the creation of a joint office for the UN Special
Advisory on R2P and the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of
Genocide.60

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Evans, supra note 31. During this time there were also debates about how
R2P should be applied in Darfur, the Congo, Sri Lanka, the response to the cyclone
in Myanmar, and Russia’s invasion of South Ossetia. Id.
56. See Francis M. Deng, The Responsibility While Protecting: Talking Points
for Remarks 2 (Feb. 21, 2012) (transcript available at http://cpdoc.fgv.br/sites/defau
lt/files/2012%2002%2021%20Statement%20-%20Francis%20Deng.pdf) (“Recent
Security Council decisions . . . show that debates now focus on the manner of
response in implementation of [R2P] rather than on the concept itself.”).
57. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General,
supra note 30, ¶ 11.
58. Id. ¶ 3.
59. Id.
60. Id. ¶ 7.
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In September 2009, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
that brought R2P back to the forefront, as it “decide[d] to continue its
consideration of the responsibility to protect.”61 The General
Assembly debates on R2P, which have occurred annually since 2009,
have demonstrated a great degree of acceptance of R2P’s principles,
with only a few voices challenging R2P’s foundation.62 Additionally,
the Security Council’s decisions in response to the conflicts in Cote
d’Ivoire, Libya, and Syria illustrate that the focus of the debates
shifted to how R2P should be implemented, rather than its underlying
principles.63
More recently, the September 2012 informal dialogue of the
General Assembly on the “Report of the Secretary-General on the
Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response” (Response
Report) focused on R2P’s third principle.64 The Response Report also
recognizes that while the first and foremost goal is prevention, there
may be times when “a timely and decisive response is required.”65
Thus, the focus has shifted to how the tenets of Paragraph 139 are to
be carried out, how their ambiguities should be resolved, and how
those tenets should evolve moving forward.66
D. R2P and Sovereignty
One of the most controversial aspects of R2P originally was its
interpretation of sovereignty.67 International law protects and
guarantees a state’s power over its citizens, which includes the right

61. G.A. Res. 63/308, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/308 (Sept. 14, 2009).
62. Gareth Evans, Co-Chair, Global Ctr. for the Resp. to Protect, R2P and
RWP After Libya and Syria (Aug. 23, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.gev
ans.org/speeches/speech485.html).
63. Deng, supra note 56, at 2.
64. Press Release, General Assembly, World Not Fulfilling ‘Never Again’
Vow, Secretary-General Tells General Assembly Meeting on Responsibility to
Protect, U.N. Press Release GA/11270, at 3 (Sept. 5, 2012).
65. U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive
Response, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/66/874-S/2012/578 (July 25, 2012).
66. See id. ¶¶14–18 (discussing the administration of R2P).
67. See Christoph Mikulaschek, Report from the 39th International Institute
Vienna Seminar on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, in THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTE CT: POLICY, PROCESS, AND PRACTICE
23 (Jan. 15, 2010), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/mikulaschek.pdf (discussing
shifting consensuses regarding how sovereignty, under R2P, confers
responsibilities upon states).
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“to be free from external meddling or interference.”68 Article 2(7) of
the UN Charter prohibits the United Nations from intervening in
matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state.69 However, under R2P, the idea is that international law
protects citizens when their governments fail grossly in their
obligations.70 While humanitarian intervention was seen as an
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, advocates of R2P say its
principles encourage state involvement in humanitarian relief by
focusing on responsibility rather than the politically unattractive right
of state intervention. 71
Proponents of R2P view sovereignty as a privilege, rather than a
right.72 Thus, sovereignty does not exclusively protect states from
foreign interference; instead, sovereignty is a state accountability tool
that safeguards the welfare of people.73 Such an idea is prevalent in
Article 1 of the Genocide Convention.74 Francis Deng, whose idea of
sovereignty as responsibility was adopted in the ICISS report, argued
that “sovereignty entailed enduring obligations towards one’s people,
as well as certain international privileges.”75 The United Nations has
attempted to quiet fears that R2P is as an illegal intrusion into
sovereignty, as seen in the 2009 Secretary-General’s report that stated
“the responsibility to protect is an ally of sovereignty, not an
adversary. It grows from the positive and affirmative notion of
sovereignty as responsibility, rather than the narrower idea of

68. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World
Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 284 (2004) (discussing different conceptions of
sovereignty).
69. Id.
70.Anne-Marie Slaughter, Intervention, Libya, and the Future of Sovereignty,
THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 4, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/20
11/09/intervention-libya-and-the-future-of-sovereignty/244537/.
71. José E. Alvarez, The Schizophrenias of R2P, in HUMAN RIGHTS,
INTERVENTION, AND THE USE OF FORCE 285, 285 (Phillip Alston & Euan
Macdonald eds., 2008).
72. The Responsibility to Protect, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISER ON THE
PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/
responsibility.shtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the SecretaryGeneral, supra note 30, ¶ 7 (discussing Deng’s idea of sovereignty as
responsibility).
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humanitarian intervention.”76 Moreover, some scholars contend that
history agrees with the United Nation’s interpretation of
sovereignty.77 Christopher Greenwood, a judge on the International
Court of Justice, argued that “modern customary international law
recognizes a right of military intervention on humanitarian grounds
by states, or an organization like NATO.”78
E.

Libya and Syria: The High and Low Points of R2P79

While some UN member states viewed the 2011 intervention in
Libya as a defining moment of R2P and its future development, other
states viewed the intervention as evidence that R2P may be utilized
for regime change, thereby raising important questions about the
powers and limitations of R2P.80 The fear of these states is that R2P
is “synonymous with regime change and loose resolution
interpretations.”81
The intervention in Libya was the first and only occasion thus far
where the “Security Council invoked [R2P] to authorize the use of
force by UN member states”82 for human protection objectives
against the wishes of a functioning state.83 In Resolution 1970, the
76. Id. ¶ 10(a).
77. See Paul R. Williams et al., Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes: The
Responsibility to Protect and the Syria Crisis, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 473, 480
(2012) (noting that, historically, humanitarian intervention has been regarded as a
right).
78. Christopher Greenwood, Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Kosovo,
10 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 141, 170 (1999). Greenwood traces such state practice to
India’s humanitarian intervention in Bangladesh. Id. at 163.
79. This section assumes a basic understanding of the facts of the NATO
intervention in Libya in 2011 and the ongoing civil war in Syria. For background
on Libya, see The Crisis in Libya, INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESP. TO PROTECT,
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-libya (last visited
Nov. 12, 2013). For background on Syria, see The Crisis in Syria, INT’L COALITION
FOR THE RESP. TO PROTECT, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crise
s/crisis-in-syria (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).
80. Hoffman & Nollkaemper, supra note 23, at 9.
81. Patrick Quinton-Brown, Saving R2P from Syria, CANADIAN INT’L
COUNCIL (Aug. 14, 2012), http://opencanada.org/features/the-think-tank/comments
/saving-r2p-from-syria/.
82. Catherine Powell, Libya: A Multilateral Constitutional Moment?, 106 AM.
J. INT’L L. 298, 298 (2012). Powell argues that the “transformation away from the
traditional Westphalian notion of sovereignty has been unfolding for decades, but
the Libyan case represents a further normative shift from sovereignty as a right to
sovereignty as a responsibility.” Id.
83. Alex J. Bellamy & Paul D. Williams, The New Politics of Protection? Côte
d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect, 87 INT’L AFF. 825, 825 (2011).
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Security Council “recalled the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to
protect their population.”84 Acting under Chapter VII and Article 41
of the UN Charter, the Security Council levied sanctions against
Muammar Gaddafi, his family, and accomplices, and imposed an
embargo on arms destined for Libya.85 Resolution 1973 was the first
time the Security Council authorized the use of force for human
protection objectives against the wishes of a functioning state, finding
that Libya had failed to uphold its responsibility to protect its
population.86
The NATO intervention in Libya, according to Secretary Ban
Ki-moon, showed that “[t]he Responsibility to Protect came of age;
the principle was tested as never before.”87 While the results may
have been “uneven,” he argued that tens of thousands of lives were
saved, thus showing that “human protection is a defining purpose of
the United Nations in the twenty-first century.”88 Evans views the
NATO-invasion in Libya as a “textbook example of how R2P is
supposed to work in the face of a rapidly unfolding mass atrocity
situation during which early-stage prevention measures no longer
have any relevance.”89
Though both the crises in Libya and Syria arose out of the Arab
Spring,90 the Security Council did not act swiftly in passing
resolutions or authorizing military force in Syria as it did in Libya.91
The delay in responding to the Syrian conflict—the Security Council
did not formally condemn the violence until February 2012, even
though uprisings began in March 2011—was not just because of the
geopolitics of Syria or the hesitation of China and Russia, both of

84. Schaper, supra note 10.
85. John F. Murphy, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Comes of Age? A
Sceptic’s View, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 413, 428 (2012).
86. Schaper, supra note 10.
87. Responsibility to Protect: Ban Urges Action to Make UN-Backed Tool ‘A
Living Reality,’ UN NEWS CENTRE (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/st
ory.asp?NewsID=40972&#.UR1v5FF2tUQ.
88. Id.
89. Evans, supra note 31.
90. Maya Bhardwaj, Development of Conflict in Arab Spring Libya and Syria:
From Revolution to Civil War, 1 WASH. U. INT’L REV. 76, 77 (2012).
91. Mick B. Krever, Why Won’t the U.N. Security Council Intervene in Syria?,
CNN (Jan. 13, 2012, 7:14 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/13/world/meast/unsecurity-council-syria/index.html.
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which have political ties to the Syrian Government.92 Instead, the
BRICS group—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—who
all sat on the Security Council in 2011, were the most critical of a
potential intervention, particularly because of how the intervention in
Libya occurred.93 Many of the states that voted against or abstained
from resolutions pertaining to Syria are the same states that “accuse
the West of abusing the wording of Resolution 1973.”94 They argue
that the resolution was a mandate “to protect civilians and civilian
populated areas under threat of attack,” not to bring about regime
change.95
The BRICS were less critical of the initial military response of
attacking Libyan air force infrastructure and ground forces.96 Instead,
their criticism pointed at what occurred after the initial attacks, when
it became more apparent that the United States, United Kingdom, and
France (known collectively as the P3) sought regime change.97
Specifically, the BRICS asserted that the interveners rejected
ceasefire offers that should have at least been considered; attacked
fleeing personnel who posed no immediate harm to civilians;
attacked locations without any military significance, such as the
compound containing Gaddafi’s relatives; and supported the rebel
side in what became a civil war.98 The Security Council resolutions
that authorized action in Libya “did not authorize outside powers to
provide air support for subsequent rebelling against Gaddafi.”99 The
BRICS also argued that “non-coercive measures were not given
sufficient time to demonstrate results in Libya.”100 Despite the P3
response as to why such action was necessary, Council members
were not given enough information at the time to sufficiently evaluate
such actions.101 Specifically, China and Russia were also critical of
92. See The Crisis in Syria, INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT,
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-syria
(last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (discussing how both China and Russia vetoed
resolutions to address the violence in Syria).
93. Evans, supra note 62.
94. Quinton-Brown, supra note 81.
95. Stuenkel, supra note 13.
96. Evans, supra note 62.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. David Rieff, R2P, R.I.P., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.c
om/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-rip.html?pagewanted=all.
100. Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response, supra note 65, ¶
54.
101. Evans, supra note 62.

198

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:184

the interpretation of the mandate in Libya, with Russia arguing that
the bombing campaign sparked by the Revolution caused civilian
casualties and such a use of force was not in strict compliance with
the resolution.102 Furthermore, South Africa later argued that the
International Criminal Court should examine the actions taken in
implementing Resolution 1973.103
While some diplomats and scholars, such as Ban Ki-moon and
Evans, see Libya as a crowning success for R2P in action, others
view the NATO intervention as the epitome of R2P’s potential for
military operationalization, which hurts R2P’s normative credibility
among those emerging powers that cautioned against the use of
military force.104 The BRICS thus view this as a warning against
further similar incidents.105 During the operation in Libya, BRICS
diplomats were allegedly treated dismissively and kept uninformed,
and such humiliation seems to be a proximate cause of the
development of RwP.106
Given the Security Council’s limited response in Syria, many
scholars have come to view R2P as unsuccessful,107 and therefore
Syria shows the limitations of R2P.108 From the start of the violence,
the United Nations used R2P to describe the conflict, issuing a
statement regarding Syria, reminding “the Government of Syria of its
ongoing responsibility to protect its population.”109 The statement

102. LUÍS PAULO BOGLIOLO PIANCASTELLI DE SIQUEIRA, THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT AND THE RESPONSIBILITY WHILE PROTECTING: AN ANALYSIS OF
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD 15–16 (Aug. 20,
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2201588.
103. Id. at 16.
104. Rieff, supra note 99.
105. Thomas Wright, Brazil Hosts Workshop on ‘Responsibility While
Protecting,’ FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 29, 2012, 11:29 AM), http://bosco.foreignpolicy
.com/posts/2012/08/29/brazil_backs_responsibility_while_protecting.
106. Id.
107. See Zack Beauchamp, Syria’s Crisis and the Future of R2P, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Mar. 16, 2012, 2:15 PM), http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/1
6/syrias_crisis_and_the_future_of_r2p (“[S]keptics and defenders of invoking
[R2P] can agree: Syria has put [R2P] . . . in crisis.”). Beauchamp, however, argues
that Syria should not be viewed as a failure for R2P. Id.
108. Williams et al., supra note 77, at 476.
109. Press Release, Special Advisers of the United Nations Secretary-General
on the Prevention of Genocide, Francis Deng, and on the Responsibility to Protect,
Edward Luck, on the situation in Syria (June 2, 2011).
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also called for “an independent, thorough, and objective investigation
into all alleged violations of international human rights law.”110 In
October 2011, the Security Council failed to adopt a resolution that
would have: (1) condemned the human rights violations in Syria; (2)
warned that action might be considered if warranted under the
unfolding situation; and (3) demanded that Syrian authorities
immediately ended the violence.111 The resolution was vetoed by
China and Russia; Brazil, India, Lebanon, and South Africa
abstained.112 China and Russia composed their own resolution which
focused on respecting sovereignty and non-intervention, the unity of
Syrians, and reaching peace through socio-economic reforms.113
South Africa indicated it was “concerned by the imposition of
punitive measures on Syria” fearing they were part of a hidden
agenda for regime change.114
Syria is “an urgent test here and now” for the R2P doctrine,
according to the Secretary-General.115 The Security Council’s
“paralysis does the Syrian people harm, damages its own credibility,
and weakens a concept that was adopted with such hope and
expectations.”116
Some diplomats have argued that in assessing how to assist the
people in Syria, there are diplomatic, legal, and economic means that
could be used to end the violence, serving as a middle ground
between non-involvement and military intervention.117 However,
until non-Western countries, like the BRICS, no longer view R2P as
a vehicle for regime change, finding such a middle ground remains
unlikely. For instance, most recently, Russian President Vladimir
Putin justified Russia’s invasion into Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula by

110. Id.
111. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft
Resolution Condemning Syria’s Crackdown on Anti-Government Protestors,
Owing to Veto by Russian Federation, China, U.N. Press Release SC/10403 (Oct.
4, 2011).
112. Id. Opponents of the resolution argued that the Council should focus on
the dialogue between the parties rather than sanctions. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Timely and Decisive Response Vital to Uphold ‘Responsibility to Protect,’
UN NEWS CENTRE (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsI
D=42806&Cr=responsibility+to+protect&Cr1=#.UNDDk1HA9UT.
116. Id.
117. Beauchamp, supra note 107.
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invoking R2P.118 Putin’s invocation of R2P illustrates the fear that
the BRICS have: the R2P doctrine is being used to mask military
aggression as humanitarian intervention. Such an invocation of R2P
demonstrates the necessity to further define—and create boundaries
to—the R2P doctrine.
II. RESPONSIBILITY WHILE PROTECTING
In September 2011, the government of Brazil proposed a new
concept, Responsibility while Protecting (RwP), the first major
reexamination of R2P since its conception.119 RwP takes the view
that the international community must demonstrate a high level of
responsibility when it exercises its duty to protect citizens from mass
atrocities.120 The concept was introduced in September 2011 at the
66th General Assembly by Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, which
preceded the concept note presented to the UN Security Council on
November 9, 2011.121 RwP arose out of the perception by Brazil and
other non-Western powers that R2P may be “misused for purposes
other than protecting civilians, such as regime change.”122 Therefore,
in many ways, RwP is an attempt to answer some questions and
address the ambiguities and problems of R2P.
Brazil’s concept paper begins by emphasizing that all diplomatic
solutions should be exhausted before military action is used.123
Moreover, “a comprehensive and judicious analysis of the possible
consequences of military action on a case-by-case basis” should be
conducted before the use of force is employed.124 The concept paper
recognizes and cautions against the harm that has occurred from
interventions, such as aggravating existing conflicts, permitting
118. Transcript: Putin Defends Russian Intervention in Ukraine, WASH. POST
(Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-putin-defendsrussian-intervention-in-ukraine/2014/03/04/9cadcd1a-a3a9-11e3-a5fa55f0c77bf39c_story.html.
119. Responsibility While Protecting – The Impact of a New Initiative on RtoP,
INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESP. TO PROTECT (Sept. 14, 2012), http://icrtopblog.org
/feature/.
120. Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Letter dated Nov. 9, 2011 from
the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General, ¶¶ 10–11, U.N. Doc. A/66/551–S/2011/701 (Nov. 11, 2011).
121. INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESP. TO PROTECT, supra note 119.
122. Viotti, supra note 120, ¶ 10.
123. Id. ¶ 7.
124. Id.
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terrorism to spread to new places, giving rise to new violence, and
increasing the vulnerability of civilians.125 After providing the
background supporting RwP, Brazil’s concept paper provides a list of
“fundamental principles, parameters and procedures,” from which
R2P and RwP can evolve together.126 The first principle, in line with
the UN Charter and as stated in the 2005 World Summit Outcome, is
that prevention is always the best course of action, and all peaceful
means should be exhausted in an effort to protect civilians threatened
by violence.127 Next, the use of force “must always be authorized by
the Security Council, in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN
Charter,” or by the General Assembly, under extraordinary
circumstances.128 Such authorization of force must be limited, and the
scope of military action should abide by the mandate given by the
Security Council or General Assembly and be carried out in
conformity with international law.129 Furthermore, the use of force
should generate as little violence and instability as possible and not
succeed the harm it was authorized to prevent.130 Lastly, the Security
Council needs to improve procedures to monitor and assess how
resolutions are interpreted and implemented to help ensure the
accountability of those states to which the use of force is granted.131
In sum, RwP emphasizes prevention above all and calls for
changes to the role of the Security Council in following an R2P
mandate. Particularly, before any action is taken under the third pillar
of R2P and under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security
Council must give “more formal and systematic attention” to
prudential guidelines and criteria.132 Once such action is taken,
enhanced Council procedures should be employed to “monitor and
assess the manner in which [the] mandates are . . . implemented.”133
Despite the attention RwP received upon its presentation in late
2011,134 neither Brazil nor the United Nations have formally
125. Id. ¶ 9.
126. Id. ¶ 11.
127. Viotti, supra note 120, ¶ 11(a)–(b).
128. Id. ¶ 11(c).
129. Id. ¶ 11(d).
130. Id. ¶ 11(e).
131. Id. ¶ 11(h)–(i).
132. Evans, supra note 62.
133. Id.
134. When Rousseff gave her opening address to the General Assembly, the
room was packed and “[i]n the months after RwP’s launch, it was impossible to
speak about humanitarian intervention without mentioning [Foreign Minister]
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advanced shaping or developing this doctrine.135 Most significantly,
on February 21, 2012, the Brazilian Permanent Mission held an
informal discussion with Member States, UN actors, and civil society
organizations to discuss RwP.136 Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota
stated that the United Nations has an obligation to develop an
awareness of the dangers involved when force is used and to create
mechanisms that provide a detailed assessment of these dangers and
ways to protect citizens.137 Most recently, there was discussion of
RwP during the annual dialogue of R2P in September 2012.138
Although several delegates expressed their support for RwP, there
was no formal discussion of RwP nor was RwP the central theme.
A.

Norm competition? RwP versus R2P

One of the earliest concerns about RwP was that it was not clear
whether it was an attempt to challenge and detract from the decade of
development of R2P as an emerging norm or a means to foster
dialogue about R2P.139 However, Ambassador Ribeiro’s speech
makes clear that RwP was not an attempt to challenge R2P, but rather
a contribution to the conceptual framework of R2P that was already
in place.140 Moreover, in its concept paper, Brazil indicated it was not
attempting to challenge R2P, but was merely attempting to clarify
Patriota’s proposal.” Oliver Stuenkel, Brazil’s Enigmatic Retreat: The Case of the
Responsibility While Protecting (RwP), POST-WESTERN WORLD (Aug. 1, 2013).
http://www.postwesternworld.com/2013/08/01/brazils-enigmatic-retreat-the-caseof-the-responsibility-while-protecting-rwp/.
135. See id. (arguing that Brazil no longer “prioritizes [RwP] matter[s]” and
that others in the Security Council have not yet decided to lead on this issue).
“While RwP continues to be mentioned during debates, there is no longer the sense
that Brazil prioritizes the matter. It has refrained from issuing an official follow-up
note to deal with some of the most convincing critics.” Id.
136. INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESP. TO PROTECT, supra note 119.
137. Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Debate on “Responsibility While
Protecting” at the United Nations (Feb. 21, 2012) (transcript available at
http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/pronunciamentodo-ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-antonio-de-aguiar-patriota-em-debate-sobreresponsabilidade-ao-proteger-na-onu-2013-nova-york-21-de-fevereiro-de-2012).
138. Press Release, General Assembly, World Not Fulfilling ‘Never Again’
Vow, Secretary-General Tells General Assembly Meeting on Responsibility to
Protect, U.N. Press Release GA/11270 (Sept. 5, 2012).
139. INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESP. TO PROTECT, supra note 119.
140. Andreas S. Kolb, The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the
Responsibility while Protecting (RwP): Friends or Foes? 2012 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE INST. 9.
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it.141 RwP was intended, instead, to become “a component of R2P’s
third-pillar vocabulary,” rather than developing into a separate norm
itself.142 While the fear does exist that a new concept like RwP may
detract from R2P,143 the greater consensus has been that RwP, if
understood as providing suggestions for implementing R2P, will
“sharpen the debate” of how to best respond to situations that warrant
the invocation of R2P.144
While Brazil may not have intended its RwP doctrine to compete
with the R2P doctrine, there are differences between the doctrines
that raise important questions. RwP requires full exhaustion of noncoercive means before more robust action is taken, whereas Secretary
General Ban Ki-moon’s R2P focuses on “early and flexible
responses.”145 RwP also proposes adopting military intervention
guidelines that were not unanimously endorsed by Member States in
the World Summit Outcome Document.146
B.

Member States Respond to RwP

RwP did not receive overwhelming support upon introduction,
though there has been a generally positive response to the proposal
over the last couple of years.147 Western states have overall been less
supportive of RwP than non-Western states, like the BRICS, who are
more wary of intervention. The Netherlands noted that over-planning
may delay action and allow the atrocities to escalate.148 The German
Ambassador raised his own concerns, noting that RwP limits the

141. Id.
142. Quinton-Brown, supra note 81.
143. Wright, supra note 105 (arguing that RwP would: (1) undermine, rather
than strengthen R2P; (2) lead to a good deal of opposition in the West; (3) lead to
greater harm to civilians because it incentivizes behavior by the adversary; and (4)
be unable to provide solutions to R2P’s issues or offer any other alternatives).
144. Deng, supra note 56.
145. Prevention Newsletter, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, Jan. 2012, at 5, available at
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/Prevention_2012_Newsletter.PDF.
146. INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESP. TO PROTECT, supra note 119; see
generally Viotti, supra note 120, ¶ 11(a)–(b) (discussing military intervention
guidelines).
147. Evans, supra note 31.
148. Ambassador Herman Schaper, Permanent Representative, Permanent
Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations, Informal Debate
on Brazilian Concept Note on “Responsibility While Protecting” (Feb. 21, 2012)
(transcript available at http://cpdoc.fgv.br/sites/default/files/2012%2002%2021%20
Statement%20-%20Netherlands.pdf).
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ability to take timely and decisive actions in important situations.149
The Ambassador publicly stated that RwP limits the scope for timely
solutions because of “its prescription of a strict chronological
sequencing, the mandatory exhaustion of all peaceful means, and the
introduction of ‘exceptional circumstances’ as an additional
qualifying trigger.”150
Some American diplomats see RwP as “anti-American banter,”
while others believe that with some edits it could help to create a new
standard.151 The United States was critical of the “higher thresholds
for the legitimacy of military intervention, such as the requirement
that [R2P’s] three pillars follow a strict line of political subordination
and chronological sequencing."152 The United States agrees with
RwP’s notion that “‘prevention is always the best policy’ and [that]
preventative diplomacy needs to be strengthened.”153 However, the
United States has highlighted two of the elements of RwP with which
it disagrees. First, the United States argues that it is a mistake to
“equate ‘manifest failure’ with strict chronological sequence.”154
There should instead be a “comprehensive assessment of risks and
costs and the balance of consequences” when making decisions,
rather than just “‘temporal’ considerations.”155 Second, the United
States disagrees with the idea that in “circumstances where collective
action is necessary, diplomacy should be considered ‘exhausted.’”156
Conversely, both China and India have “welcomed” RwP,157 and
149. Ambassador Dr. Peter Wittig, Permanent Representative of Ger. to the
United Nations, Informal Discussion on “Responsibility While Protecting” (Feb.
21, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/Informal%
20discussion%20on.pdf).
150. Id.
151. Matias Spektor, The Arab Spring, Seen from Brazil, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23,
2011, 2:55 AM), http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/23/the-arab-springseen-from-brazil/. All diplomats with whom the author spoke thought the Libya
intervention should be seen “as a model for the future [as it was] a show of force
that was quick and decisive and properly approved by the U.N.” Id.
152. Paulo, supra note 102, at 19.
153. U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Remarks by the United States at an
Informal Discussion on “Responsibility while Protecting” (Feb. 21, 2012)
(transcript available at http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/184487.htm).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Quinton-Brown, supra note 81. H.S. Puri of India stated:
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Russia is committed to “participat[ing] constructively in developing
[the] idea” of RwP.158
The only organized UN dialogue on RwP thus far was an
informal discussion coordinated by the Permanent Mission of Brazil
on RwP on February 21, 2012.159 The consensus was that RwP was
welcomed as a means of enhancing R2P’s implementation, but R2P’s
framework, as set out in the World Summit Outcome Document, was
not to be renegotiated.160
III. MOVING FORWARD: RWP’S CONTRIBUTION TO R2P
RwP raises important considerations for the future of R2P and
should be embraced as a dialogue regarding R2P, not as a competing
norm. Gareth Evans, for instance, believes that the RwP proposal,
with further development, can play a critical role in advancing R2P as
an accepted international norm.161 R2P has the potential to become a
norm of international law, but after Libya and Syria, the doctrine of
R2P is unlikely to take this step without incorporating some elements
from RwP.162 The growing perception that R2P is at its core about
“[I]n the implementation of the Council’s mandate for protecting
civilians, there is the need to ensure the responsibility while protecting.
The recent actions of some organizations and member-states have brought
to the fore a considerable sense of unease about the manner in which the
humanitarian imperative of protecting civilians has been interpreted for
actual action on the ground. Monitoring of the manner in which the
Council’s mandates are implemented has, therefore, assumed great
significance and importance.”
H.S. Puri, Permanent Representative at the Security Council, Open Debate on
“Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict” ¶ 11 (June 25, 2012) (transcript
available at http://www.un.int/india/2012/ind2040.pdf).
158. Quinton-Brown, supra note 81.
159. United Nations Informal Discussion on “Responsibility While
Protecting”, INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESP. TO PROTECT (Feb. 21, 2012),
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35r2pcs-topics/4002-informal-discussion-on-brazils-concept-of-responsibility-whileprotecting. Brazil’s Minister of External Relations Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar
Patriota and UN Special Adviser for the Responsibility to Protect Dr. Edward Luck
co-chaired the discussion. Id. The following gave remarks: (1) twenty-two Member
States; (2) the European Union, (3) Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide
Francis Deng; and (4) several civil society organizations (the Global Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect, Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict, and Human
Rights Watch). Id.
160. Id.
161. Evans, supra note 62.
162. Id.
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regime change makes it more challenging for the international
community to achieve its protection objectives.163 While RwP is
unlikely to put an end to Security Council deadlock, it can address
some of the rhetoric hindering R2P’s normative development: “[i]f
dissenters no longer fear R2P’s ambiguities of implementation, they
can more confidently employ R2P language in UN debates and
approve related resolutions.”164 The BRICS felt bruised by P3’s
dismissiveness during the Libya campaign, and these “bruises will
have to heal before any consensus can be expected on tough
responses to such situations in the future.”165
The most notable elements of RwP that should be incorporated
into R2P are the strengthening of prevention and the need for
accountability and assessment in the Security Council.166 Above all,
RwP seeks a renewed focus on prevention.167 While rhetoric does
exist already in the R2P doctrine on prevention, there is a
demonstrated need for firm strategies.168 Scholar Alex Bellamy
suggests three elements of prevention: first, improvements in
capacity building, specifically examining what the United Nations
does to assist with the prevention of mass atrocities and how
capacities can be strengthened to fill in the current gaps; second, a
need to strengthen the United Nation’s early warning and early
assessment capabilities, leading to an additional need for resources
besides those currently provided to the Joint Office to improve
analytical capacity; and third, a focus on prevention of genocide and
mass atrocities, which needs to be “mainstreamed into the work of
the whole UN system.”169
The need for greater accountability and assessment in the
Security Council is based on the BRICS’ allegations that the P3
expanded the mandate in Libya to regime change, and the BRICS
request better procedures in how the Security Council holds states
163. Viotti, supra note 120, ¶ 10.
164. Quinton-Brown, supra note 81.
165. Evans, supra note 62.
166. Alex Bellamy, R2P—Dead or Alive?, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT—FROM EVASIVE TO RELUCTANT ACTION? THE ROLE OF GLOBAL MIDDLE
POWERS 11, 22–23, 25 (Malte Brosig ed., 2012), available at http://www.issafrica.o
rg/uploads/FromEvasiveReluctantAction.pdf.
167. Id. at 22.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 23.
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accountable that act on its mandates.170 Bellamy criticizes the
BRICS’ procedural requests, arguing that such changes would result
in a change to the UN Charter and would make it more difficult for
the Security Council to reach a consensus in a timely manner.171
However, measures that could be taken to strengthen accountability
include having the Security Council write “accountability measures
into its resolutions” based on the particular issue, which parallels
RwP’s focus on stronger analysis in making decisions.172 Bellamy
suggests that the UN Secretariat should be tasked with assessing the
best responses to situations and providing briefings to the Security
Council on emerging solutions and possible options.173
Additionally, the Security Council should adopt a set of criteria,
including an enhanced monitoring and review process that will
encourage debate among Security Council members and ensure the
proper implementation of mandates that call for the use of military
force.174 Regarding criteria, Evans suggests that the unimplemented
recommendations of the ICISS Commission and the reports that
followed listed five specific prudential guidelines that the Security
Council should consider before authorizing any coercive military
action under Chapter VII of the Charter, instead of only in R2P
situations.175 Evans recognizes the criticism of such guidelines may
be that “‘rigid criteria’ [are] impossible to apply” in real world
situations; his response is that these critiques “overstate the case, and

170. Id.
171. Id. at 24.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 25.
174. Evans, supra note 62.
175. Id. The five specific guidelines are:
First, seriousness of risk: is the harm occurring or being threatened of such
a kind and scale as to justify prima facie the use of force? Second, primary
purpose: is the use of force primarily intended to halt or avert the threat in
question, whatever secondary motives might be in play for different
states? Third, last resort: has every non-military option been fully explored
and the judgment reasonably made that nothing less than military force
could halt or avert the harm in question? Fourth, proportionality: are the
scale, duration, and intensity of the proposed military action the minimum
necessary to meet the threat? And fifth, balance of consequences: will
those at risk ultimately be better or worse off, and the scale of suffering
greater or less? Will more good than harm be done?
Id.
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sometimes simply conceal a preference for behaving in a completely
ad hoc fashion.”176
Regarding process, explicit R2P mandates like Resolution 1973
leave the responsibility to implement the mandate to the large,
powerful states that are unlikely to welcome close scrutiny of their
operations.177 However, such states should have an obligation to
regularly check back with the Security Council to provide an update
on how the mandate is being interpreted and the progress of the
operation, thereby permitting debate on how the mandate is being
carried out.178 These reports would be less about holding states
legally accountable, but more about recognizing that destructive
skepticism about interventions will grow “unless the courts of
rationality, public opinion and peer group understanding can be
broadly satisfied.”179
Ultimately, with a renewed focus on prevention, there needs to
be compromise among states. Western states that may favor
intervention should “provid[e] real resources to strengthening
preventive capacities.”180 States that are skeptical of intervention
should be more willing to act earlier to deal with an imminent crisis
and allow for an earlier response from the international
community.181
While the government of Brazil was in the best position to
continue the dialogue about RwP, as it originally presented the
concept and it co-led an informal dialogue on RwP in early 2012, it
has failed to update the concept note or further advance RwP.182
Other nations, particularly developing powers, should work to gain
support for RwP and its development, given that “R2P only
prospered because of a small group’s tireless efforts to promote the
topic.”183

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Bellamy, supra note 166, at 22.
181. Id.
182. Wright, supra note 105.
183. Stuenkel, supra note 134 (“In the same way, RwP is unlikely to have a
lasting impact on the debate without a powerful and credible sponsor like Brazil.”).

2014]

BRAZIL’S ‘RESPONSIBILITY WHILE PROTECTING’

209

CONCLUSION
For R2P to become a universally accepted international norm,
Western states should consider what elements of RwP could be
incorporated into their understanding of R2P. While it is premature
for scholars to declare “R2P, R.I.P,”184 the deadlock in the Security
Council over what action to take in Syria has allowed the Syrian
Government to continue committing crimes against humanity.185
While R2P’s framework may be nearly universally accepted,
operationalizing the concept is not, as demonstrated in Syria. This is
due in large part to hesitation by non-Western states fearful of
intervening, particularly after NATO’s intervention in Libya. If nonWestern states have contributed to and accepted R2P, it is less likely
that there will be future delays like the one in Syria. RwP suggests
that implementing R2P does not necessarily need to look like the
Libyan campaign in the future, and instead a compromise can be
reached that focuses on prevention, and pre-intervention guidelines
and criteria that are flexible enough to secure the agreement of
Western states. The world must not return to the days of the
Holocaust, Rwanda, or Srebrenica where governments commit mass
atrocities against their own citizens. R2P provides promise as an
international norm capable of preventing the reoccurrence of such
human rights abuses, but in order to get support from the
international community at large, the doctrine of R2P should
incorporate RwP principles.

184. Rieff, supra note 99.
185. Howard LaFranchi, Deadlock on Syria: Likely Crimes Against Humanity,
But No Plan of Action, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 13, 2012), www.csmonitor.
com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2012/0213/Deadlock-on-Syria-Likely-crimes-againsthumanity-but-no-plan-of-action/.

